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Accountability for Pesticide Poisoning of 
Undocumented Farmworkers 
By Elizabeth Lincoln 
Abstract 
The illness burden experienced by farmworkers from exposure to pesticides 
is unparalleled in any other workforce in the United States.  This paper explores 
current, specific legal protections available to undocumented farmworkers in 
California who suffer from pesticide poisoning.  Despite efforts to regulate, use of 
dangerous pesticides remains rampant nationwide.  Considering at least half of 
farmworkers are undocumented immigrants, the risk of retaliation is a central 
concern for reporting.  Using California as a case study, this paper looks at both 
state and federal remedies for farmworkers.  Exploring these various legal 
frameworks, this paper will weigh the pros and cons to each approach, considering 
at the forefront the particularly vulnerable situation in which undocumented 
immigrants find themselves: vulnerable to exploitation, retaliation, and 
deportation.  In conclusion, the author advocates for federal protection from 
deportation for undocumented farmworkers who suffer from pesticide poisoning 
in the form of expanded eligibility for the U-visa. This will lead to more accurate 
reporting of the issue, increased support for criminal prosecutions for the criminal 
misuse of pesticides, and, hopefully, accountability for pesticide poisoning of 
undocumented farmworkers. 
Introduction 
Headaches, migraines, allergic reactions, nausea, asthma, vomiting, diarrhea, 
skin conditions, seizures, shortness of breath, cancer, infertility, respiratory 
problems, neurological issues, tumors, lung failure, leukemia, hypertension, 
diabetes.1  These are all health effects linked to pesticide exposure, which “causes 
farmworkers to suffer more chemical-related injuries and illnesses than any other 
workforce in the nation.”2  Of the approximately 1.4 million farmworkers in the 
 
1. Exposed and Ignored: How Pesticides are Endangering our Nation’s 
Farmworkers, FARMWORKER JUSTICE (2013); see also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A 
Poisoned Field: Farmworkers, Pesticide Exposure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of 
Regulatory Failure, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 431, 443, 491 (2015). 
2. Pesticide Safety, FARMWORKER JUSTICE (2017), https://www.farmworker 
justice.org/content/pesticide-safety [https://perma.cc/BL5J-BQ3U]. 
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United States,3 the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) estimates that up to 
20,000 farmworkers are poisoned by pesticides annually.4  For a variety of reasons 
explored in this Note, pesticide poisoning likely occurs at a much higher rate than 
this reported estimate.  Farmworkers and their children experience exposure to 
pesticides at work, at home, and at school because pesticides move beyond the 
targeted areas for application as dust or droplets through the air during and after 
application.5  This process, called “pesticide drift,” poses health risks to the non-
targeted adjacent areas such as “nearby homes, schools, and playgrounds” and 
“farm workers in adjacent fields.”6  Lack of data regarding farmworkers generally, 
and pesticide misuse and resulting illness specifically, works to the advantage of 
farmers who use pesticides to increase crop yield and economic gain.7  The 
farmworker population suffers in this non-transparent system, where regulations 
vary greatly state by state.8   
Compounding the difficulty of reporting, symptoms of pesticide poisoning 
may also resemble symptoms of the flu and are hard to detect.9  If symptoms are 
detected, farmworkers face barriers to medical care due to immigration status and 
language barriers.10  The majority of farmworkers speak little English,11 and at 
least half of the farmworker population is undocumented (meaning the workers do 
 
3. BON APPÉTIT MGMT. CO. FOUND. & UNITED FARM WORKERS, INVENTORY OF 
FARMWORKER ISSUES AND PROTECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2011); see also 
Unfinished Harvest: The Agricultural Worker Protection Act at 30, FARMWORKER JUSTICE 
(2013) (estimating the number of farmworkers in the United States as two million workers). 
4. 40 C.F.R. § 170.2.   
5. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Introduction to Pesticide Drift https://www.epa.gov/ 
reducing-pesticide-drift/introduction-pesticide-drift 
6. BEYOND PESTICIDES, Farmworkers Push for Long Overdue Protections, https:// 
beyondpesticides.org/dailynewsblog/2013/07/farmworkers-arrive-in-d-c-to-push-for-long-
overdue-protections/ [https://perma.cc/X8FM-BTZE]; see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
Introduction to Pesticide Drift https://www.epa.gov/reducing-pesticide-drift/introduction-
pesticide-drift (defining pesticide drift as “the movement of pesticide dust or droplets 
through the air at the time of application or soon after, to any site other than the area 
intended.  Pesticide droplets are produced by spray nozzles used in application equipment 
for spraying pesticides on crops, forests, turf and home gardens.  Some other pesticides are 
formulated as very fine dry particles (commonly referred to as dust formulations).”) 
7. BON APPÉTIT, supra note 3, at 1 (“No data, no problem.”). 
8. Id. (“Labor law investigations and record keeping of regulatory enforcement are 
poor and the monitoring efforts at both the federal and state levels are typically untraceable 
and non-transparent.”); see also Exposed and Ignored, supra note 1, at 14 (“Regulatory 
Isolation: Pesticide Exposure Reporting Map”). 
9. Exposed and Ignored, supra note 1, at 8. 
10. Michael A. Celone, Undocumented and Unprotected: Solutions for Protecting 
the Health of America’s Undocumented Mexican Migrant Workers, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH 
L. & POL’Y 117, 117–18 (2013). 
11. Breaking Down the Barriers: A National Needs Assessment on Farmworker 
Health Outreach, HEALTH OUTREACH PARTNERS, 4th ed., 31 (Apr. 2010) (“Regarding 
language fluency, the majority (75%) of U.S. farmworkers primarily speak Spanish 
followed by English (21%).”). 
  
 Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 2018 
 
385 
 
not have a legal immigration status or permission to work in the United States).12  
The proportion of undocumented farmworkers has more than tripled in the past 
thirty years, and some estimate the number to be as high as seventy percent.13  
Another twenty-one percent of farmworkers are permitted to work with temporary 
visas or as lawful permanent residence status.14  Farmworkers without legal status 
or with temporary permission to work in the United States risk deportation as 
retaliation for reporting illegal use of pesticides.15   
This Note will ask if and how undocumented immigrant farmworkers 
themselves can hold parties responsible for pesticide poisoning, what risks that 
litigation would bring, and contemplate possible solutions.  Proceeding through 
possible solutions, the maze of statutes purporting to protect farmworkers at a 
federal and state level is exposed as insufficient and ineffective, largely favoring 
farmers and manufacturers.  An immigration-related solution to the problem of 
pesticide poisoning is an opportunity to make progress towards redressing physical 
ailments and improving the lives of farmworkers.  California is used throughout 
this Note as a case study to compare protections to those in other states. California 
is among the few states which provide additional, comprehensive protections for 
agricultural workers and has a comprehensive reporting scheme.16  Additionally, 
 
12. Id. (“According to the Pew Hispanic Center, there are approximately half a 
million unauthorized workers within U.S. agricultural industry, more than any other sector 
in the country.  This estimate is thought to be even higher due to seasonal workforce 
fluctuations.  Moreover, the percentage of unauthorized hired crop farmworkers in the U.S. 
has quintupled since 1989.”). 
13. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP’T &TRAINING ADMIN., DATA TABLES (1989-2014) 
(Table 1. National Demographic Characteristics), https://www.doleta.gov/naws/pages/ 
research/data-tables.cfm [https://perma.cc/QME9-8NPJ]; see also Alfonso Serrano, Bitter 
Harvest: U.S. Farmers Blame Billion-Dollar Losses on Immigration Laws,” TIME MAG. 
(Sept. 21, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/09/21/bitter-harvest-u-s-farmers-blame-
billion-dollar-losses-on-immigration-laws/ [https://perma.cc/3XFF-7P7W]; Margaret Gray 
& Emma Kreyche, The Hudson Valley Farmworker Report: Understanding the Needs and 
Aspirations of a Voiceless Population, BARD COLL. MIGRANT LABOR PROJECT (2007) 
(seventy-one percent of workers were undocumented in this study of New York workers); 
Philip Martin & Richard Mines, Alien Workers and Agriculture: The Need for Policy 
Linkage, 1 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 255, 260 (1983). 
14. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 13 (twenty percent of workers have Legal 
Permanent Residency and one percent are “other work authorized”). 
15. See, e.g., Lisa Peck Lindelef, California Farmworkers: Legal Remedies for 
Pesticide Exposure, 7 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 72, 85 (1988) (“[M]igrant farmworkers, especially 
undocumented ones, may resist seeking medical services for fear of retaliation, or loss of 
jobs. . . .  [F]armworkers are not likely to initiate lawsuits for redress for pesticide-related 
illness.”). 
16. See, e.g., BON APPÉTIT, supra note 3, at 31, 58 (citing California as protecting 
workers in the several of the primary issues affecting U.S. farmworkers today: wage and 
hour standards, protection for children and youth farmworkers, regulation of farm labor 
contractors, heat stress regulations, and pesticide exposure.  California also requires 
mandatory pesticide applicator certification renewal at two year intervals, which is more 
frequent than most states (asides from Washington)); see also Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
Environmental Justice Program, What is Environmental Justice? (Dec. 14, 2017, 3:28 PM), 
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the California Labor Code protects undocumented workers by prohibiting inquiry 
into immigration status in certain situations, such as workplace injury liability for 
employers.17  However, because of the nature of pesticide poisoning and the 
overlap with immigration law, this author advocates for a federal response to 
protect agricultural workers who report illegal use of pesticides resulting in 
pesticide poisoning from deportation by expanding the U-visa eligibility to include 
this population. 
Section I of this Note provides a history and framing of the issue of pesticide 
use.  Section II discusses the population that suffers most from pesticide misuse 
and illegal use.  The information presented in Sections I and II offers some reasons 
why data on pesticide-related illnesses is sparse and likely underestimates the 
problem.  Sections III and IV turn to the federal and state remedies for a 
farmworker who is poisoned by illegal use of pesticides and seeks legal recourse 
or compensation.  The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(“FIFRA”) and the Worker Protection Standards (“WPS”) govern the registration 
of pesticides that outline permissible use, as well as protections for workers who 
handle pesticides.18  Section V contemplates possible state claims in California, 
including the strengths and weaknesses of possible tort claims.  Section VI presents 
an argument for the enactment of federal protections from deportation for 
undocumented agricultural workers who report illegal use of pesticide resulting in 
poisoning of workers. 
There is no single solution to the problem of pesticide poisoning of 
farmworkers in the United States.  While lawmakers have proposed different forms 
of visas for agricultural workers—some protecting the workers, and others that 
solely protect the economic interests of the industry—none of the proposed 
legislation specifically responds to the problem of pesticide poisoning.  The U-visa 
was created to protect and encourage victims of crime in the United States to come 
forward, thus increasing the availability of data and opportunity for a 
comprehensive resolution to the problem.  U-visas require certification from a law 
enforcement agency, which currently “includes agencies that have criminal 
investigative jurisdiction in their respective areas of expertise, including, but not 
limited to, child protective services, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, and the Department of Labor.”19  Expanding the current U-visa 
statute to allow the EPA to certify petitions for U-visas based on the criminal use 
of pesticides resulting in harm to workers would help both the workers and the 
EPA in successfully regulating pesticides under FIFRA and WPS.  Including the 
EPA as a certifying agency is both feasible—it was done with the Department of 
 
https://calepa.ca.gov/EnvJustice/ [https://perma.cc/8NZW-SG4E] (“California was one of 
the first states in the nation to codify Environmental Justice in Statute.”); Alan Ramo, 
Environmental Justice as an Essential Tool in Environmental Review Statutes: A New Look 
at Federal Policies and Civil Rights Protections and California’s Recent Initiatives, 19 
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 41–42 (Winter 2013). 
17. Cal. Labor Code § 1171.5(a). 
18. 40 C.F.R. § 170 (WPS); 7 U.S.C. § 136 et seq. (1996). 
19. 8 C.F.R. §214.14(a)(2). 
  
 Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 2018 
 
387 
 
Labor in 201520—and comports with the purpose of the U-visa.  With more 
information, FIFRA prosecutions will be more effective, and the criminal statutes 
in place can be put to use.  Thus, this solution has the possibility of increasing 
reporting, s those who have been affected by pesticide poisoning, and allowing for 
more evidence to be used in prosecutions against farm owners who are misusing 
pesticides to the severe detriment of this vulnerable workforce. 
How Pesticides Make Farmworkers Sick, and Why Cases of Pesticide 
Poisoning Are Underreported 
How could intelligent beings seek to control a few unwanted species by a 
method that contaminated the entire environment and brought the threat of disease 
and death even to their own kind?21 
(u) Pesticide 
The term “pesticide” means (1) any substance or mixture of 
substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or 
mitigating any pest, (2) any substance or mixture of substances 
intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, and (3) 
any nitrogen stabilizer, except that the term “pesticide” shall not 
include any article that is a “new animal drug” . . . .22 
 
Each year, 5.1 billion pounds of pesticides are applied to crops in the United 
States.23  Pesticides are used to increase yields in farms, protect crops from weeds 
and invasive species, and control vector-borne diseases.24  However, pesticides 
present a double-edged sword: the same aspects that benefit farm owners are 
hazardous to the worker, consumer, and anyone within the range of exposure.  
Documented effects of pesticides include “contaminated land and water; decreased 
soil quality; ecological harm to nontarget animals, aquatic organisms, and 
beneficial insects; increased resistance among pests (resulting in super pests); and 
poisonings and chronic health problems among human beings who suffer 
exposure.”25 
In the 1940s, hundreds of new chemicals were produced “for use in killing 
insects, weeds, rodents, and other organisms described in the modern vernacular 
 
20. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(2). 
21. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING 8 (First Mariner Books ed., 2002) (1962). 
22. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u). 
23. Exposed and Ignored, supra note 1, at 8.   
24. Md. Wasim Atkar, Dwaipayan Sengupta, & Ashim Chowdhury, Impact of 
Pesticide Use in Agriculture: Their Benefits and Hazards, 2 INTERDISCIP. TOXICOL. 1, 2–3 
(2009). 
25. Danica Li, Toxic Spring: The Capriciousness of Cost-Benefit Analysis Under 
Fifra’s Pesticide Registration Process and Its Effect on Farmworkers, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 
1405, 1408 (2015). 
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as ‘pests.’”26  The use of pesticides increased after World War II, when scientists 
discovered dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (“DDT”) could be used to kill body 
lice and mosquitos causing malaria in soldiers overseas.27  The success of DDT led 
to the introduction of more pesticides, encouraged by the United States Department 
of Agriculture (“USDA”), which taught farmers about this new, effective means of 
pest control.28  This paralleled the increased involvement of the federal government 
in regulation of pesticides, and led to the passage of FIFRA in 1947.29  Control of 
pesticide regulations affecting the agricultural industry at that time was in the hands 
of pesticide manufacturers, users, and regulators to the exclusion of farmworkers.30  
This three-pronged grip empowered special interests “at the expense of sound 
environmental policy.”31 
Public opinion shifted in the 1950s as pesticides were revealed as the cause 
of deaths of nontarget species and animals, and various crises in which huge crops 
were contaminated with pesticides or herbicides known to cause cancer.32  The 
public became increasingly involved in the politics of pesticide use after failures 
in the 1950s to hold the government responsible for the effect on consumers and 
workers, rather than favoring special interests, and eventually efforts turned away 
from the courts and towards Congress.  Consciousness of this harm also increased 
in the 1960s with the publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.33  Carson’s 
book exposed the “cumulative poisoning” effect of pesticides to humans and the 
environment, and alerted the public to the presence of pesticides in land, air, and 
water.34  More than the acute symptoms of pesticide poisoning, Carson urged 
readers to consider evidence of the “delayed effects of absorbing small amounts of 
pesticides that invisibly contaminate our world.”35  This seminal book inspired a 
generation of activists, and yet, use of pesticides has not diminished. 
 
26. Carson, supra note 21, at 7. 
27. Andrew P. Morriss & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights, Pesticides, & Public 
Health: Explaining the Paradox of Modern Pesticide Policy, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6–
9 (Fall 2002). 
28. Id. at 9.   
29. Id. 
30. See section II infra for the discussion of the disenfranchisement of farmworkers. 
31. Morriss & Meiners, supra note 27, at 8; Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from 
Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. 
ON REG. 369, 410 (Summer 1993); see also Guadalupe T. Luna, An Infinite Distance?: 
Agricultural Exceptionalism and Agricultural Labor, 1 U. PA. J. OF LABOR & EMP’T L. 487, 
488 (1998) (discussing how the “lack of study” of conditions of farm workers aids the 
agricultural industry by disincentivizing accountability, promoting the “exclusion of 
workers,” and perpetuating a system where “the isolation of workers remains entrenched 
without opportunity for beneficial change.”). 
32. Morriss & Meiners, supra note 27, at 16. 
33. Carson, supra note 21. 
34. Id. at 173. 
35. Id. at 88. 
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Thus, for the past half century, evidence has shown that pesticides have at 
least some negative effect on those who come into contact with them.  The harm 
caused by the “substance or mixture of substances” that forms a pesticide is due to 
three factors: persistence, formulation, and toxicity.36  Based on these factors, 
many pesticides have restrictions on how they can be used or the time after 
application that workers must wait before returning to the field.37  But these 
restrictions may not fully anticipate the variety of ways a farmworker can be 
exposed to pesticides.  Farmworkers most commonly experience pesticide 
exposure from drift in air and residues on crop plants during routine activity, where 
exposure is not expected or protective gear is not worn.38 
A study of farmworkers’ exposure to pesticides between 2005 and 2009 
found that, of the farmworkers exposed to pesticides, only sixteen percent “had 
mixed, loaded, or applied pesticides in the last 12 months . . .” concluding that “all 
farmworkers have a risk of exposure to pesticides directly and/or to pesticide 
residues, sometimes days after pesticides have been applied to their work areas.”39  
Even after farmworkers leave their jobs for the day, “there is a constant risk of 
indirect exposure for farmworkers and others who work or live near farms.”40  In 
fact, a study showed that in all reported agricultural exposures between 2002 and 
2006, fifty-two percent of the exposures occurred while the worker was doing 
“routine work: not applying pesticide.”41 
Pesticide exposure can cause both acute and chronic illness.  Farmworkers 
experience “headaches, nausea, shortness of breath, or seizures” in the short term, 
and “cancer, infertility (and other reproductive problems), neurological disorders, 
and respiratory conditions” in the long term.42  Chronic illness linked to pesticide 
exposure is difficult to detect and connect to a particular incident or pesticide in 
order to, for instance, succeed in proving causation in a personal injury claim.  
Thus, the chronic effects of pesticide exposure are distinct from other “signature 
diseases” that can more easily be linked to a particular toxin, such as mesothelioma 
in asbestos litigation.43 
Despite increased protection through new laws and incorporation of federal 
standards in the state, pesticide illnesses continue to plague workers in California.  
However, there is reason to believe that increased protection for workers does in 
 
36. Lindelef, supra note 15, at 79. 
37. See part III infra for a discussion of federal registration and regulation of 
pesticides under FIFRA. 
38. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REG., SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
FROM THE CA PESTICIDE ILLNESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 2014, HS-1900, at 5 (2016) 
(hereinafter CEPADPR); Li, supra note 25, at 1414–15. 
39. BON APPÉTIT, supra note 3, at 31, 58. 
40. Id. at 44. 
41. Id. 
42. Exposed and Ignored, supra note 1, at 4. 
43. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 1, at 491. 
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fact increase reporting.44  In 2014, the California Pesticide Illness Surveillance 
Program of the Department of Pesticide Regulation reported that “148 agricultural 
field workers were injured by pesticide exposure in 25 separate episodes.”45  In the 
database, there were 1,073 reported illnesses that were considered “pesticide 
associated cases.”46  Of those cases, 117 had a “high degree of correlation between 
the pattern of exposure and resulting symptomatology,” based on “physical 
evidence of exposure and medical evidence of consequent ill health.”47  Another 
603 cases found a “probable” relation to a pesticide exposure, and another 353 with 
a “possible” relation to a pesticide exposure.48 
Workers, as compared to consumers, are at much higher risk of pesticide 
illnesses.  In California, workers accounted for 247 cases of pesticide related illness 
in the database mentioned above.49   Occupational incidents of pesticide exposure 
account for about half of the associated cases.50  The illness may be attributed to 
misuse of pesticides or violation of safety requirements or not associated with any 
violations.  The “PISP epidemiologists concluded that 630 (59%) of the 1,073 
associated cases contained evidence to indicate a violation of safety requirements 
that contributed to the exposure.”51  In a single incident, forty field workers were 
injured;52 however, single episodes are not the only cause of illness, and evidence 
shows that “[p]esticide drift . . . was associated with 132 (90%) of the 148 field 
worker cases in 15 separate episodes.”53  Again, not only are workers exposed 
throughout their work day, but also usually live nearby and can be exposed to 
pesticides overnight, or on days off.54  In a testimony on Capitol Hill, Virginia Ruiz 
of Farmworker Justice told Congress, “[t]he close proximity of agricultural fields 
 
44. See, e.g., Calvert GM, Beckman J, Prado JB, et al. Acute Occupational Pesticide-
Related Illness and Injury—United States, 2007-2011. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 
2016;63:11–16. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/63/wr/mm6355a3.htm [https://perm 
a.cc/74EX-WQAH] (“Although the incidence rates for acute occupational pesticide-related 
illness and injury were highest in Washington, this finding might not necessarily mean that 
pesticide exposures are more hazardous or more prevalent in that state. Washington has 
stronger protections for agricultural workers and a larger and more robust pesticide illness 
and injury surveillance program when compared to other states, which likely accounts for 
some of the differences in incidence rates.”). 
45. CEPADPR, supra note 38, at 5. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 14. 
50. CEPADPR, supra note 38, at 14 (showing 524 cases of “occupational status” and 
542 cases of “non-occupational status.”  Occupational status is defined as whether the 
individual was on the job at the time of the incident). 
51. Id. at 15. 
52. Id. at 21. 
53. Id.; see also PAN/CRLA, Fields of Poison at 5 (“Fifty-one percent of poisoning 
cases from 1998 to 2000 occurred when pesticides drifted from the site of application onto 
workers.”). 
54. CEPADPR, supra note 38, at 19. 
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to residential areas and schools makes it nearly impossible for farmworkers and 
their families to escape exposure because pesticides are in the air they breathe and 
the food they eat, and the soil where they work and play.”55 
Despite this data, the “use of hazardous agricultural pesticides in California 
increased by 23 million pounds (12%) in 2015 over the prior year to a staggering 
213 million pounds,” amounting to the “second highest use recorded since 1990.”56  
Of the 213 million pounds, 100 million pounds were used in four counties in the 
San Joaquin Valley.57  This increase includes pesticides with severe, well-
documented, negative effects.  One such pesticide, chlorpyrifos, which is linked to 
autism, IQ loss, and ADHD, was recently approved as safe to use by the Trump 
Administration’s EPA Administrator, Scott Pruitt.58  The pervasive use of 
pesticides in California is likely to continue in the face of this Administration’s 
alliances with companies like Dow Chemical, which produces chlorpyrifos.59 
The Farmworker Population in California and Nationally, and Risk 
of Reporting due to Immigration Status 
This section discusses the profile of farmworkers in California and 
nationally, emphasizing the theories of environmental justice and agricultural 
exceptionalism at the forefront of understanding the historical and current position 
of farmworkers in the political sphere.  Generally, legal disputes are linked to the 
social process through the determination of how injuries are perceived, how an 
injury becomes a grievance, and how an injured person seeks redress.  These issues, 
and the basis of the article “The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: 
Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . .” inform the conversation regarding the interaction 
between the environmental justice movement, agricultural exceptionalism, and 
farmworkers today.60  The first factor which influences the personal decision to 
pursue dispute resolution, or legal action, is the detection of injustices 
 
55. Beyond Pesticides, Farmworkers Push for Long Overdue Protections, DAILY 
NEWS BLOG (July 16, 2013, 12:02 AM), https://beyondpesticides.org/dailynewsblog/2013 
/07/farmworkers-arrive-in-d-c-to-push-for-long-overdue-protections/ [https://perma.cc/ 
X8FM-BTZE]. 
56. Jane Sellen, Pesticide Use Up Sharply in California, According to New DPR 
Data, CALIFORNIANS FOR PESTICIDE REFORM, (May 4, 2017), http://www.pesticidere 
form.org/2017/05/04/pesticide-use-up-sharply-in-california-according-to-2015-dpr-data/ 
[https://perma.cc/YH9X-V3TP]; see also CEPADPR, supra note 38. 
57. Sellen, supra note 56. 
58. Id.; see also Eleanor Sheehan, “In Trump’s America, People Sue the EPA to 
Block a Toxic Pesticide”, MOTHER JONES (July 9, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
environment/2017/07/in-trumps-america-people-sue-the-epa-to-block-a-toxic-pesticide/ 
[https://perma.cc/J3ZB-8SQ9]. 
59. Michael Biesecker, EPA Chief Met With Dow CEO Before Deciding On Pesticide 
Ban, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 3, 2017), https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/correction-
epa-dow-chemical-story [https://perma.cc/4T8D-AKSC].  
60. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 
(1980-81). 
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themselves.61  The article contemplates a community living downwind from a 
nuclear testing site whose exposure results in cancer, analogous to the farmworker 
community living and working in an area with aerial pesticide applications.62  
Ultimately, the authors find that “factors of class, education, work situation, social 
networks” determine who is aware of their cancer and who is not.63  The article 
focuses on the early stages of “naming, blaming, and claiming” as crucial to 
inequality or access to justice, and how seeking legal relief usually encompasses a 
high degree of uncertainty and cost.64  Similarly, this section looks at the multitude 
of reasons that a farmworker will not bring a claim against his or her employer for 
pesticide exposure. 
 
Undocumented Farmworkers and Environmental Justice 
 
The American Farm Bureau Federation estimates that there are about 2.4 
million farm workers in the United States as of 2014.65  Farmworkers are hired 
directly by growers, through Farm Labor Contractors (“FLCs”), or through a guest 
worker program by growers or FLCs on an H-2A immigrant visa.66  Hiring may 
be done for a short- or long-term period and payment may be hourly, by piece-rate, 
or daily.67  The 2007 Census data estimates that one third of all farmworkers, or 
about 471,000 individuals, work in California.68  The majority of the workers 
started working in United States agriculture between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen, and less than a quarter have graduated from high school.69  The average 
annual personal income of a farmworker in the United States is $15,000-$17,499.70 
In California, the numbers are similar, but the United States Department of 
Labor, Employment and Training Administration (“ETA”) estimates that about 
fifty-six percent of California’s farmworkers are undocumented compared to forty-
 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 631. 
63. Id. at 633. 
64. Id. at 653. 
65. Patrick O’Brien, John Kruse & Darlene Kruse, “Gauging the Farm Sector’s 
Sensitivity to Immigration Reform Via Changes in Labor Costs and Availability”, AM. FARM 
BUREAU FED’N & WORLD AGRIC. ECON. & ENVTL. SERVS. 27 (Feb. 2014). 
66. BON APPÉTIT, supra note 3, at 4 (“Farm Labor Contractors (FLCs) act as 
intermediaries between growers and laborers and are licensed by the U.S. Department of 
Labor and regulated by the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act . . . .  
The use of FLCs varies by state, and it is estimated that FLCs supply 50 to 75 percent of 
farmworkers in California alone.”). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (However, as discussed in this paper, these numbers may be inaccurate due to 
the various factors which contribute to the difficulty in estimating the number of 
farmworkers.). 
69. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 13. 
70. Id. 
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seven percent nationally.71  About thirty percent are Legal Permanent Residents, 
and fourteen percent are United States citizens by birth or naturalization.72  In 
California, forty percent of farmworkers reported to the ETA that their English 
speaking ability was “not at all,” thirty-four percent reported “somewhat,” and 
thirteen percent reported that they speak English “well.”73 
There is also a plethora of child labor in U.S. agriculture.74  In 2010, Human 
Rights Watch reported that in the United States “children farmworkers as young as 
twelve years old often work for hire for ten or more hours a day, five to seven days 
a week” and that “[s]ome start working part-time at age six or seven.”75  The Center 
for Disease Control’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health calls 
agriculture “the most dangerous work open to children in the United States.”76  
Aside from the dangers inherent in this employment, children are vulnerable to the 
harms of pesticides in their communities during sensitive developmental years.77 
These statistics are important because they shed light on the increased 
vulnerabilities of farmworkers due to immigration status, lack of economic power, 
language barriers, and age, leading farmworkers to be considered an environmental 
justice community.  At the First National People of Color Environmental 
Leadership Summit in Washington D.C. in 1991, seventeen principles of 
environmental justice were adopted, among them “environmental justice affirms 
the right to political, economic, cultural and environmental self-determination of 
all peoples,” and “demands the cessation of the production of toxins, hazardous 
wastes, and radioactive materials.”78 
California has codified environmental justice in statute, defining the term as 
“the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, and incomes with respect to the 
development, adoption, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, 
regulations, and policies.”79  For documented and undocumented farmworkers—
 
71. Id. 
72. Id.   
73. Id.   
74. US: Child Farmworkers’ Dangerous Lives, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 5, 
2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/05/05/us-child-farmworkers-dangerous-lives 
[https://perma.cc/PQ8Q-R6CA]. 
75. Id.   
76. Id. (citing Centers for Disease Control National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health (NIOSH)). 
77. Emily C. Marquez & Kristin S. Schafer, Kids on the Frontline: How Pesticides 
are Undermining the Health of Rural Children, PESTICIDE ACTION NETWORK (2012) 
http://www.panna.org/sites/default/files/KOF-report-final.pdf.   
78. Principles of Environmental Justice, 1991 First National People of Color 
Environmental Leadership Summit (Oct. 24-27, 1991), available at http://www.ejnet. 
org/ej/principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL6K-JK2Z]. 
79. Cal. Gov’t Code § 65040.12 (West 2013); see also Joan D. Flocks, The 
Environmental and Social Injustice of Farmworker Pesticide Exposure, 19 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 255, 256 (2012). 
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”historically one of the most exploited groups of people”80—the effect of the 
FIFRA and WPS cost-benefit standards is described as “the dilemma of 
inadequately protective standards, in this case ultimately resulting in farmworkers 
literally laboring under a standard that does not account for the economic, political, 
social, cultural and medical reality of their daily lives.”81 
The California EPA’s “Fresno Initiative Report,” sheds light on the multitude 
of environmental harms encountered by the farmworker population in an area that 
“leads in the state’s agricultural production value” and “faces air quality and 
pesticide issues” not present anywhere else in the state.82  The report identified 
Fresno as “an area that disproportionately experiences pollution burden and 
vulnerabilities.”83  The environmental justice movement is important to issues 
affecting farmworkers, particularly those in areas such as California’s Central 
Valley, because it draws attention to the need for multipronged solutions to address 
the problems faced by this community.  One way to do that is to address 
immigration status as a barrier to reporting pesticide poisoning. 
 
Agricultural Exceptionalism and Historical Disenfranchisement of 
Farmworkers 
 
Compounding the issues facing farmworkers that has led to their status as an 
environmental justice community is the historical discrimination against 
agricultural workers, regardless of immigration status.  “Agricultural 
exceptionalism” is a term used to describe the “structural bars” of racial and gender 
equality, and the institutional discrimination against agricultural workers, which 
began with the exploitation of African-American labor, and continues today with 
a largely Latinx agricultural worker population.84  Historically, agricultural 
workers were exempted from the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938—laws that are said to have been enacted with 
great influence from Southern plantation owners.85  The result is “agriculture’s 
unique status in law and society,” where “[t]he farm sector has been and remains 
the nation’s most significant industry with a special need and with its own set of 
 
80. Eileen Gauna, Farmworkers as an Environmental Justice Issue: Similarities and 
Differences, 25 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 67, 72 (2001). 
81. Id. at 68. 
82. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVTL. JUSTICE COMPLIANCE & ENF’T WORKING 
GRP., FRESNO INITIATIVE REPORT (2015), https://calepa.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites 
/62/2016/10/Enforcement-Publications-2015yr-FresnoReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/28WB-
CA35]. 
83. Id.   
84. Li, supra note 25, at 1414–15; see also Luna, supra note 31, at 488; BON APPÉTIT, 
supra note 3, at 5. 
85. Kamala Kelkar, When Labor Laws Left Farm Workers Behind – and Vulnerable 
to Abuse, PBS NEWS HOUR (Sept. 18, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/labor-
laws-left-farm-workers-behind-vulnerable-abuse [https://perma.cc/U7J3-S8WS]. 
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interest groups.”86  Unsurprisingly, that industry operates to safeguard its own 
interests, not that of its laborers. 
The concept of agricultural exceptionalism was first identified by Carey 
McWilliams, and today the perpetuation of the “unequal and disparate treatment 
of farm laborers” continues in many forms.87  As protections for labor unions and 
organizers increased, farmworkers were left out.  Farmworkers could not organize 
and were excluded from fair labor standards until 1966.88  This change in the 1960s 
and 1970s came despite large resistance to the movements led by Dolores Huerta 
and Cesar Chavez to organize farmworkers in California as the United Farm 
Workers, which continued for years to come.89  Notwithstanding the victories of 
the United Farm Workers, “FLSA continues to regulate the employers of 
farmworkers more leniently than employers in other occupations,”90 and small 
employers are still exempt.91  The Occupational Safety and Hazards Act (“OSHA”) 
is another federal regulation that does not target pesticides generally, and exempts 
farmworkers on small farms.92  California, Washington, and Oregon have enacted 
state occupational safety and hazards regulations to make up for the gap in federal 
protections, which have had an impact in increased reporting in those states.93  
 
86. Luna, supra note 31, at 489 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing 
Donald B. Pederson, Introduction, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 401, 403). 
87. Id. (citing ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO 
STORY 106 (1964)). 
88. Li, supra note 25, at 1414. 
89. Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers’ Legal 
Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the Role of Law in Union Organizing Today, 8 U. PA. 
J. LABOR & EMP’T L. 1, 11 (2005) (“As decades of sporadically successful strikes had 
shown, farm workers were not completely without power. But until the UFW, no farm 
worker organizing effort had been able to create an organization of farm workers with the 
creativity, persistence, and stability to fight for on-going union representation and win, much 
less to negotiate multi-faceted con-tracts and administer them over several seasons.”); see 
also Louis Sahagun, After 36 Days, Chavez Halts Protest Fast, L.A. TIMES, (Aug. 22, 1988), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-08-22/news/mn-556_1_fernando-chavez [https://perma.cc/ 
4JFA-EGSD] (describing Chavez’s 36-day fast “to seek an end to the use of pesticides that 
he said endanger farm workers, consumers and the environment”). 
90. Li, supra note 25, at 1414–15. 
91. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, UNFINISHED HARVEST: THE AGRICULTURAL WORKER 
PROTECTION ACT AT 30, at 6 (2013), https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default 
/files/FarmworkerJusticeUnfinishedHarvest.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RZ6-AA5V]. 
92. Philip D. Somervell & George A. Conway, Does the Small Farm Exemption Cost 
Lives?, 54 AM. J. OF INDUS. MED. 461 (2011), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/ 
10.1002/ajim.20931 (defining small farms as those with fewer than eleven employees and 
finding that “fatality rates were approximately 1.6 to 3 times as high in both groups of states 
observing the small farm exception as in the group of three states [California, Washington, 
and Oregon] not observing it”).  
93. Id., see also CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, http://www.cdpr.ca.gov 
[https://perma.cc/RN54-XYR6]; see also Geoffrey M. Calvert et al., Acute Occupational 
Pesticide-Related Illness and Injury: United States, 2007-2011, 63 MORBIDITY & 
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OSHA, like FIFRA, is similarly under-enforced in its protection of farmworkers 
and defers to WPS for pesticide safety issues.94 
The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“MSPA”), 
passed in 1983, was seen as an important step forward in the recognition of the 
need for wage and working condition regulation for farmworkers under the U.S. 
Department of Labor.95  Protections afforded to farmworkers under MSPA include 
regulation of FLCs,96 accountability to FLCs and employers, provision of 
information to workers regarding wage and hour details of work, as well as health 
and safety standards relating to housing and transportation of farmworkers.97  
However, as Farmworker Justice reports in the thirty year review of the Act, 
“Unfinished Harvest,” enforcement efforts of MSPA are also “limited and often 
ineffective.”98 
Federal statutes such as MSPA, FIFRA, and OSHA, often embrace the 
concept of agricultural exceptionalism through their exclusion of undocumented 
workers from laws that otherwise protect the health of American workers.  
However, these statutes have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.99  
In 2002, the Supreme Court held in a five-to-four decision that undocumented 
immigrants were not entitled to back pay from the National Labor Relations Board 
in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB.100  While courts have interpreted 
Hoffman narrowly to preserve an undocumented workers’ cause of action for 
retaliation and other employment claims, courts can also deny a claim if it “runs 
counter to immigration policy.”101  Applying this principle, the court in Singh v. 
Jutla contemplated the Immigration Reform and Control Act (“IRCA”), which 
stated as a primary goal to crack down on employers of undocumented workers.102  
Running “counter” to immigration policy does not always weigh in favor of an 
employer in a claim.  For example, it was considered counter to immigration policy 
 
MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 11 (Oct. 14, 2016), available at https://www.cdc.gov/ 
mmwr/volumes/63/wr/mm6355a3.html [https://perma.cc/LW72-6EE8]. 
94. Li, supra note 25, at 1414–15; see also OSHA Agricultural Operations: Hazards 
& Controls https://perma.cc/B89A-T753 (“The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
oversees pesticide use through the Worker Protection Standard (WPS).”). 
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.; FARMWORKER JUSTICE, UNFINISHED HARVEST, supra 
note 91, at 7.   
96. BON APPÉTIT, supra note 3, at iii. 
97. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, UNFINISHED HARVEST, supra note 90, at 7. 
98. Id. at 10.   
99. Celone, supra note 9, at 117–18. 
100. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144–49 (2002). 
101. Singh v. Jutla & C.D. & R’s Oil, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 
2002).   
102. PL 99-603 (S 1200), Nov. 6, 1986, 100 Stat 3359 (Section 101. Control of 
unlawful employment of aliens). 
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to preclude a claim of retaliation where the employer reported the employee to 
INS.103 
In Singh v. Jutla, an undocumented employee who sought unpaid wages 
claimed that his employer reported him to Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(“INS”) in retaliation.104  The Court in Singh v. Jutla recognized, “[i]ndeed, every 
remedy extended to undocumented workers under the federal labor laws provides 
a marginal incentive for those workers to come to the United States.  It is just as 
true, however, that every remedy denied to undocumented workers provides a 
marginal incentive for employers to hire those workers.”105  Singh reconciled this 
“tension” by “balance[ing] competing considerations.”106  This exposes the 
difficult relationship between the reality of shifting immigration policy and 
employment laws and protections for workers—here, the Court worked hard to 
avoid any holding which would encourage employers to hire undocumented 
employees who had no form of relief in the case of retaliation. 
The rights granted under Hoffman and Singh allow undocumented workers 
to file claims against their employers.107  Thus, these cases represent a carve out to 
the otherwise exclusionary federal protections that expose farmworkers to 
workplace abuses.  These claims are not specific to pesticide poisoning, but for all 
complaints of any type of workplace abuse.  Nonetheless, doing so exposes the 
employee to the risk that the employer will call Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”).  If the employer does call ICE, and the employee does not 
have work authorization, it does not matter that the employer acted in retaliation 
(even though it is illegal to do so) because ICE may still use the information against 
the worker, place him or her in deportation proceedings, and even subject the 
worker to criminal charges.108  It is for this reason that one study of dairy workers 
in New York found that “workers identified immigration status as an occupational 
hazard, making them more vulnerable and putting them at further risk at the 
 
103. Contreras v. Corinthian Vigor Ins. Brokers, Inc., 25 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D. Cal. 
1998). 
104. Singh, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. 
105. Id. at 1062; but c.f. Reyes v. Van Elk, Ltd., 148 Cal. App. 4th 604, 616 (2007) 
(finding that while back pay and lost wages are not available to undocumented workers 
under Hoffman, IRCA did not preempt plaintiff’s claims under California’s state wage law); 
Incalza v. Fendi N. America, Inc., 479 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding for 
employee who was discharged based on immigration status, IRCA did not preempt 
California law because “there were remedies short of discharge that were permissible under 
federal law”). 
106. Singh, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 1062. 
107. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) (holding that undocumented 
employees can bring an action under the NLRA); see also Patel v. Quality Inn South, 846 
F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1988) (extending Sure-Tan v. NLRB to the FLSA). 
108. LEGAL AID AT WORK, “Undocumented Workers: Employment Rights,” 
https://legalaidatwork.org/factsheet/undocumented-workers-employment-rights/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7E55-ZC8Z] (last visited Mar. 11, 2018) (note that this applies to all employment 
complaints, not just those related to environmental harm). 
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workplace.”109  Another trend documented by National Public Radio and 
ProPublica is undocumented immigrants being “flagged by insurers or their private 
detectives,” turned over to state fraud investigators, and charged with “fraud or 
willful misrepresentation in connection with any official matter or application 
before a governmental agency” for the unauthorized use of a false social security 
number (used in order to work).110 
Considering the history of agricultural exceptionalism, and the current 
classification as an environmental justice community, it is easy to understand that 
underreporting of pesticide-related illness is common among farmworkers.111  
Additionally, underreporting is due to a lack of a system to track illnesses relating 
to poisoning, cultural and linguistic barriers, fear of retaliation (employment or 
immigration), and lack of medical options.112  Compounding these factors, as 
discussed in this paper, farmworkers may experience symptoms similar to the flu 
without realizing that their illness is due to the chemicals in their work 
environment.”113  The following sections explore the potential remedies for a 
farmworker who, despite the obstacles enumerated in this section, decides to move 
forward and report pesticide poisoning. 
Federal Enforcement for Farmworkers Who Report Pesticide 
Poisoning 
The EPA, through FIFRA and the WPS, is tasked with setting standards for 
the use of pesticides by farm owners and manufacturers, and the protection of 
workers from dangerous exposure to those same chemicals.114  The Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) is also in charge of criminal and civil enforcement of 
FIFRA.  FIFRA’s role is to govern the registration of pesticides, and includes a 
requirement to submit data to the EPA and the WPS.115  The statute’s scope is 
limited; FIFRA does not “regulate a waste stream, such as hazardous waste, created 
by the manufacturing or use of a product, nor the ‘negative externalities’ such as 
 
109. Amy Liebman, Dairy Workers’ Immigration Status: An occupational Safety 
Hazard?, HARVESTING JUSTICE: A BLOG BY FARMWORKER JUSTICE (Feb. 22, 2016), 
https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/fj-blog/2016/02/dairy-workers-immigration-status-
occupational-safety-hazard [https://perma.cc/SWL4-UYJN]. 
110. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, They Got Hurt at Work—Then They Got 
Deported, NAT’L. PUB. RADIO: NPR INVESTIGATIONS (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www. 
npr.org/2017/08/16/543650270/they-got-hurt-at-work-then-they-got-deported [https:// 
perma.cc/T2KG-4VAQ]. 
111. Exposed and Ignored, supra note 1, at 6 (“Several factors contribute to the 
underestimation of the problem, including the inability and apprehension of affected 
workers to get medical care, medical misdiagnosis, and the absence of a coordinated national 
incident reporting system.”). 
112. Id. at 8 (“Less than 20% of hired farmworkers receive employer-provided health 
insurance.”). 
113. Id. 
114. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (2012). 
115. Id. 
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air or water pollution, from manufacturing or other activities.”116  FIFRA has been 
called the “weakest environmental statute.”117  This Note argues that FIFRA and 
WPS, despite their weaknesses, cannot function even for their stated purpose with 
the current indications that farmworkers themselves are deterred from reporting 
violations of these statutes. 
The FIFRA statute lays out the requirements, exemptions, and the procedure 
for pesticide registration.118  The registration requirement states: “to the extent 
necessary to prevent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the 
Administrator may by regulation limit the distribution, sale, or use in any State of 
any pesticide that is not registered.”119  The EPA describes the evaluation process 
on its website as a “scientific, legal and administrative procedure.”120  This process 
includes a risk assessment based on an evaluation of the “harm to humans,”121 but 
has been criticized for abusing the “cost-benefit” analysis interpretation and 
weighing economic factors higher than the effects on human life.122 
The federal EPA and state affiliates are tasked with enforcement, inspection, 
and compliance with the WPS.123  These standards set the baseline for health and 
safety standards and regulations for employers with regards to pesticides.  WPS 
requires employers post information regarding pesticide restrictions, limit 
employee contact with restricted-use pesticides, provide employees with 
knowledge of those restrictions for particular pesticides, safety training, protective 
gear, decontamination sites, and emergency assistance in the event of pesticide 
poisoning.124 
Significantly for the farmworker seeking redress for injuries procured from 
an illegally used pesticide, FIFRA does not have a citizen enforcement 
provision.125  Thus, all claims must be filed by the Administrator, not the 
 
116. Michael J. McClary & Jessica B. Goldstein, FIFRA at 40: The Need for Felonies 
for Pesticide Crimes, 47 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10767–768 (2017). 
117. Id. at 10770 (2017). 
118. 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)-(c) (2012). 
119. Id. 136(a) (2012). 
120. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PESTICIDE REGULATION, About 
Pesticide Registration, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/about-pesticide-regist 
ration [https://perma.cc/A7FP-4J9W] (last accessed Dec. 16, 2017). 
121. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PESTICIDE REGULATION, About 
Pesticide Registration, https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/about-pesticide-regis 
tration [https://perma.cc/A7FP-4J9W] (last accessed Dec. 16, 2017). 
122. Li, supra note 25, at 1424 (discussing other factors that undermine “accuracy 
of the cost-apprehension process”).  It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the 
particular criticisms of the FIFRA registration process, but increased reporting under this 
proposed course of action may allow FIFRA to better apply the cost-benefit analysis in light 
of these criticisms. 
123. 40 C.F.R. §170. 
124. Id. 
125. Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., 91 Cal. App. 4th 698, 708 (2001) (“The penalties 
for violation of FIFRA can only be imposed by the Administrator.  Private parties . . . have 
no recourse for recovery for their injuries under FIFRA.”). 
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farmworker.  On one hand, this makes sense because FIFRA only governs licensing 
and regulation of pesticide products. However, injured farmworkers are left 
without any recourse after reporting to the agency.  In the 1990s, advocates such 
as the National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides (NCAMP) and the 
Agricultural Resources Center (ARC), challenged the lack of a private cause of 
action under FIFRA, and were met with fierce opposition by industry groups such 
as the American Farm Bureau, the Chemical Producers and Distributors 
Association, as well as lobbyists with the National State Departments of 
Agriculture.126  The EPA’s Assistant Administrator Lyn Goldman testified “that 
under the current FIFRA, ‘if someone were literally killed by the misuse of a 
pesticide, the maximum penalty for a first-time, private applicator would be a letter 
of warning.”127  Indeed, a study by the Pesticide Action Network of North America 
found that “in fiscal year 1996-97, a total of 657 fines were issued statewide.128  
The majority of the 5,153 actions were ‘notices of violation’ and ‘letters of 
warning’ which carry no fine and are not recorded in permanent statewide 
records.129  The report also noted a startling fact: that no county in California’s 
Central Valley, the state’s agricultural heartland, issued more than an average of 
twenty five fines per year.”130 
The inability to pursue a private cause of action deprives farmworkers 
suffering from pesticide poisoning of a crucial legal tool that has been employed 
in the “air pollution, water pollution and hazardous waste regulation [contexts 
where] private citizen suits have been the engines that drive the regulatory agenda 
forward, as conventional environmental groups sued the EPA to meet statutory 
deadlines and routinely sue polluters directly to enforce requirements of the 
environmental statutes.”131  Instead, farmworkers’ only option under FIFRA is to 
file a complaint “alleging or indicating a significant violation of the pesticide use 
provisions” of FIFRA, which the Administrator then sends to state officials to 
investigate.132  In Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., where consumers challenged 
chemical manufacturers and distributors of pesticides, the court instructed 
plaintiffs to use California common law to redress pesticide exposure-related 
illnesses.133  The plaintiffs were permitted to move forward with their state law 
claims, but had no cause of action under FIFRA.134 
 
126. See McClary & Goldstein, supra note 116 at 10771 (discussing the History of 
FIFRA Penalty Proposals, beginning in 1989, where “the primary focus of industry 
opposition to the enforcement provisions . . . was the citizen suit provision”). 
127. Id. at 10774. 
128. Gauna, supra note 80, at 73. 
129. Id. at 73. 
130. Id. at 72. 
131. Id. at 73. 
132. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136(w). 
133. Arnold v. Dow Chemical Co., 91 Cal. App. 4th 698, 708 (2001). 
134. Id. at 746.   
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Claims that are investigated by the EPA, thus, can have a wide range of 
outcomes. Criminal prosecutions are rare, but FIFRA criminally punishes “any 
registrant, applicant for a registration, or producer,” who knowingly violates the 
pesticide regulations by with a penalty of up to $50,000 or up to one year in prison, 
or both.135  FIFRA also criminally punishes commercial applicators with a lower 
penalty of $25,000 or one year in prison, or both.136  A third category of “private 
applicators” are subject to a lesser fine ($1,000) and reduced prison time (not more 
than thirty days).137  An additional felony prosecution under FIFRA is reserved for 
“disclosure of information,” defined as “[a]ny person, who, with intent to defraud, 
uses or reveals information relative to formulas of products acquired under the 
authority of section 136a of this title.”  Violators of this felony provision may be 
subject to a fine up to $10,000 or up to three years in prison, or both.138 
In 2016, defendants were sentenced to the maximum of one year in prison 
for knowingly, illegally applying pesticides (in this case, a pesticide used to kill 
termites) resulting in permanent injuries to a nine-year-old boy.139  The principle 
defendant pled guilty to illegally applying the pesticide, contrary to label 
requirements, which led to a family entering their home too soon after 
application.140  Recognizing that “nobody set out that day to cripple a little boy,” 
the United States District Judge Jose E. Martinez, when presented with the 
evidence, still lamented the one-year maximum in light of the evidence of the 
defendants’ actions.141  Also classified as FIFRA misdemeanor offenses 
investigated by the EPA are “FIFRA crimes in which people have died or been 
incapacitated; land has been contaminated; wildlife indiscriminately poisoned; and 
false information submitted to the government.”142 
Because of the minimal penalties, among other issues discussed in this Note, 
it is not surprising that there are few criminal prosecutions under FIFRA.  In fact, 
since 1998, the EPA reports fourteen criminal prosecutions in California under 
FIFRA.143  Since 2012, the EPA reports just six prosecutions in the state, all for 
 
135. 7 U.S.C. §136l(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
136. Id. §136l(b)(1)(B); see also 7 U.S.C. 136(e)(3) (defining commercial applicator 
as one who “uses or supervises the use of any pesticide which is classified for restricted use 
for any purpose, or on any property” (excluding private property)).  
137. Id. §136l(b)(2). 
138. Id. §136l(b)(3). 
139. McClary & Goldstein, supra note 116, at 10767. 
140. EPA ENFORCEMENT, SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: FISCAL YEAR 
2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fumigation-company-and-two-individuals-sentenced 
-connection-illegal-pesticide-application [https://perma.cc/36DH-GXZ6].   
141. McClary & Goldstein, supra note 116, at 10767. 
142. Id.   
143. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, 
https://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/criminal_prosecution (filtered by the state of California 
and the FIFRA statute). 
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pesticides used in marijuana cultivation,144 despite a record of 662 incidents 
between 2012 and 2014 in farm settings and agricultural usage documented by the 
California Environmental Protection Agency Department of Pesticide Regulation 
(“DPR”).145 
This is perhaps why Michael J. McClary and Jessica B. Goldstein call FIFRA 
“the weakest federal environmental statute” in the article “FIFRA at 40: The Need 
for Felonies for Pesticide Crimes.”146  McClary and Goldstein, both of whom work 
at the EPA Office of Criminal Enforcement, Forensics and Training, discuss cases 
“which expose the inadequacy of the current FIFRA criminal penalty provisions,” 
arguing that misdemeanor penalties do not “effectively deter pesticide crimes.”147  
Prosecutions under FIFRA are particularly difficult given the nature of the 
pesticide industry, where misconduct is primarily motivated by financial gain.148  
As Paul Correa points out, the “Circle of Poison” of pesticide use dictates that “[i]t 
is not your health that determines how much of a chemical pesticide can be on your 
lettuce and tomatoes—it is the economy.”149 
For parties prosecuted under FIFRA provisions, a $1,000 fine is unlikely to 
deter the illegal behavior.  Relatively small fines and prison sentences do not 
encourage prosecutors or judges to take FIFRA crimes seriously, or spend their 
time litigating claims with relatively small penalties that require complex legal or 
factual issues.150  Additionally, compared to other federal environmental crime 
enforcement statutes, FIFRA penalizes as misdemeanors what other statutes 
consider felonies—yet another reason FIFRA lacks deterrent force.151  Further 
reducing opportunity for prosecution is the memo sent by the EPA guiding 
investigative discretion in the Office of Criminal Enforcement, which guides 
expenditures of resources based on cases “worthy of criminal investigation.”152  
The guiding principles in this memo tell prosecutors to exercise discretion to 
choose cases where there is “significant environmental harm” and “culpable 
conduct.”153  This begs the question of whether FIFRA today is fulfilling its 
 
144. Id. (Defendants served between seventeen months and ten years in prison and 
paid up to $4,294 in restitution, but FIFRA prosecutions were in conjunction with other 
criminal charges related to controlled substance cultivation in all cases.).   
145. CEPADPR, supra note 38, at 5. 
146. McClary & Goldstein, supra note 116, at 10770. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Paul Correa, Tort and the U.S.-Mexican Circle of Poison, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 653 (1995). 
150. McClary & Goldstein, supra note 116, at 10770 (noting also that the fine is 
often reduced where a plea bargain is struck). 
151. Id. 
152. Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Director, EPA Office of Criminal 
Enforcement, to All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal Enforcement 
Program 3 (1994), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files /documents/exercise.pdf (the 
Exercise of Investigative Discretion). 
153. Id. 
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purpose of “protecting man and the environment,”154 particularly where the 1972 
amendments explicitly included farmworkers in the definition of “man.”155 
The effectiveness of FIFRA prosecutions are thus impeded by the low 
penalties, compounded by the difficulty of overcoming financial incentives, 
compounded again by the EPA directive to implement narrow case selection 
criteria.  McClary and Goldstein go on to discuss EPA criminal cases for “farm 
misapplications,” noting the immense vulnerability of agricultural workers to 
pesticide misuse and illegal use.156  In one case, the owner and operator of Casa 
Famoso Packing in California was charged and pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor 
count after he ordered the spraying of the pesticide Agri-Mycin 17 while his 
workers were in the field thinning Asian pear trees.157  The “restricted use” 
regulation of the pesticide recommended that workers keep out of the field for 
twelve hours after application.  Nevertheless, the owner and operator of the 
company ordered they work during and immediately after application.158  
Unsurprisingly, workers experienced pesticide-related symptoms—“headaches, 
rashes, sore throats, and burning eyes.”159  The court’s remedy for these workers 
was to penalize their employer under FIFRA with one misdemeanor count and a 
$1,000 fine.160  This remedy, which awards the fine to the government, not the 
workers themselves, shows the relatively small penalty for an employer versus the 
potential impact on a laborer with an average annual salary of $15,000-$17,499.161 
State Statutes and Remedies for Farmworkers Who Report Pesticide 
Poisoning 
Many states also exempt agricultural workers, in whole or in part, from 
workers’ compensation schemes.162  States primarily exclude farmworkers who 
perform seasonal work, those who work on small farms, or children—populations 
 
154. S. REP. 92-838 (1972) (“The new bill would[:] (A) regulate the use of pesticides 
to protect man and his environment; and (B) extend Federal pesticide regulation to actions 
entirely within a single State.”). 
155. Id. 
156. McClary & Goldstein, supra note 116, at 10767. 
157. Id. at 10770. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 10778. 
160. Id. 
161. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, supra note 13. 
162. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, HEALTH AND SAFETY RESOURCES, WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION GUIDES WITH FORMS, https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/ 
files/State%20Workers%20Comp%20Information%20for%20Health%20Centers%207-20 
16.xlsx (showing that the workers’ compensation scheme in Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, 
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Dakota, South 
Carolina, and Texas all consider coverage for agricultural workers “elective,” meaning 
agricultural workers are exempt from labor code requirements.  Additionally, another 23 
states have limited requirements for employers).   
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that also do not have mandatory minimum wage or overtime pay requirements.163  
Some states, like California, have increased legal protections for farmworkers—
including the provision in the California Labor Code including all farmworkers in 
workers compensation regulation, regardless of immigration status.164  However, 
as I will discuss, a federal response is necessary due to the unique migratory 
population and the risks that farmworkers face in other states.165 
Because there is no private right of action under FIFRA, and few 
prosecutions, an individual farmworker may choose instead to pursue a state 
remedy.  First, one must consider the preemption doctrine under FIFRA to ensure 
that the state claim is not preempted by the federal act.  The preemption clause in 
FIFRA states, “such state shall not impose or continue in effect any requirement 
for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this 
subchapter.”166  Preemption under FIFRA is restricted to a small class of claims, 
however, and will not affect all claims concerning liability for pesticide 
poisoning.167  In essence, claims that are preempted are those that “boil[] down to 
an assertion that a pesticide’s label failed to warn of the damage plaintiff allegedly 
suffered.”168 
The next step for a farmworker pursuing a state claim, then, is to consider 
tort remedies. But proving a case can expose obstacles specific to the issue of 
pesticide poisoning and the population affected.  These obstacles include, but are 
not limited to, having a sophisticated understanding of the regulatory process and 
where it may have been violated, deciding on a proper defendant for the action, a 
successful theory of liability, and proving causation.  These questions require 
knowledge of the defendant’s knowledge of the dangers of a particular pesticide, 
the pests to be eradicated, and in some cases, whether the defendant’s conduct 
 
163. Li, supra note 25, at 1414–15; see also Joan D. Flocks, The Environmental and 
Social Injustice of Farmworker Pesticide Exposure, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 255, 
269-70 (2012); Somervell & Conway, supra note 91. 
164. Cal. Labor Code § 1171.5(a). 
165. See, e.g., Grabell & Berkes, supra note 110 (discussing multiple cases where 
reporting injuries, receiving workers’ compensation medical treatment, and insurance 
company involvement led to undocumented worker deportations in Florida). 
166. 7 U.S.C. §136 et seq. 
167. Id. §136(v) (the preemption statue); Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 1, at 486 
(2015); see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 444 (2005) (finding that 
Texas peanut farmers’ claims for defective design, defective manufacture, negligent testing, 
and breach of express warranty were not preempted by FIFRA because they rested on the 
manufacturer’s responsibility “to design reasonably safe products, to use due care in 
conducting appropriate testing of their products, to market products free of manufacturing 
defects, and to honor their express warranties or other contractual commitments” which 
“plainly do not qualify as requirements for ‘labeling or packaging.”); see also Etcheverry v. 
Tri-Ag Service, Inc., 22 Cal. 4th 316, 337 (2000) (holding that a Plaintiff’s claim is not 
preempted “where off-label statements address matters outside of the scope of the label”). 
168. Etcheverry, 22 Cal. 4th at 335. 
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deviated from industry standards.169  While the defendant is responsible for 
knowing the laws and regulations, the plaintiff in this hypothetical case would need 
to show that the defendant knew the dangers and disregarded them. 
These questions are difficult to answer for any layperson, and particularly a 
farmworker who does not speak English, who is afraid of retaliation, and wants to 
keep his or her job.170  In the event that a claim is not preempted under FIFRA, 
there are three main theories under which farmworkers can challenge pesticide 
poisoning at a state level: 1) product liability, including manufacturing defect, 
design defect, and warning defect; 2) strict liability, for abnormally dangerous 
activities; and 3) negligence or negligence per se.171 
Tort liability for growers might incentivize prioritization of farmworker 
safety, especially because growers usually do not employ the workers directly and 
are thus not ordinarily legally responsible for workers’ compensation.172  However, 
each of these theories are vulnerable to potential problems that are exacerbated in 
the context of pesticide poisoning, such as a statute of limitations, contributory or 
comparative negligence, and assumption of the risk.173  Statute of limitations issues 
arise primarily because the health impacts of pesticide poisoning may only 
manifest themselves long after the exposure.  Causation, contributory or 
comparative negligence, and assumption of the risk can be difficult to prove 
because farmworkers often work with multiple pesticides at once. 
Causation may be eased if a farmworker has an immediate reaction from 
single pesticide, but that is rarely the case. As a “physician who oversees 
farmworker health clinics observes, ‘I’ve never known a farmworker who was 
exposed to only one pesticide.’”174  While some pesticides, such as 
organophosphates, that can be detected through laboratory testing, making 
documentation of exposure possible through a blood or urine test,175  this is further 
complicated by the difficulty of timing urine or blood test, assessing what level in 
the body actually causes damage.176  Ultimately, for these reasons, tort recovery 
has the potential to improve safety for farmworkers, but protections are imperfect 
and vary state by state.177 
 
169. Anne M. Payne, Causes of Action for Damage from Pesticides, 39 CAUSES OF 
ACTION 579 (2017). 
170. Although, there are legal organizations that represent farmworkers in 
employment adjudications.  See, e.g., Kati L. Griffith, U.S. Migrant Worker Law: The 
Interstices of Immigration Law and Labor and Employment, 31 COMP. LABOR L. & POL’Y 
125 (2009) (Section III, Migrant Worker Advocacy, discussing worker groups, non-profit 
legal groups and attorneys, and policy advocacy groups who provide crucial advocacy to 
individual migrant workers and migrant workers as a whole.). 
171. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 1, at 472–82.   
172. Id. at 505. 
173. Id. at 482–90. 
174. Id. at 443, 491.   
175. Id. at 472–82. 
176. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 1, at 472–82. 
177. Id. at 505. 
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In California, workers’ compensation insurance coverage is mandated for 
agricultural workers, regardless of immigration status.178  Only thirteen states 
require “unqualified” workers’ compensation coverage for agricultural workers 
(meaning that farmworkers are provided with insurance coverage without 
exception for those with short-term jobs, fewer employees, etc.), and California is 
not among them.179  In order to secure benefits, a worker or their attorney must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
1) The worker suffered a work-related injury or an occupational illness; 
2) The worker notified the employer of the ailment within 30 days of its 
occurrence or of learning of it; 
3) The worker is an employee of the entity identified as the employer; 
4) The worker has followed all the health care providers’ instructions, 
including when to return to work and any work restrictions; and, 
5) The worker’s degree of remaining permanent disability [after the alleged 
injury], if any, after reaching a permanent and stationary level.180 
The California labor code includes farmworkers in general workers’ 
compensation schemes without inquiry into immigration status.181  Worker’s 
compensation coverage can provide substantial aid to workers harmed by 
pesticides.  In the event of a job-related injury or illness, coverage in California 
will provide rehabilitation, medical services including any needed hospitalization, 
laboratory tests, medications, payment in the event of a disability, and some 
monetary support for disabled workers or surviving dependent family members, 
however that rehabilitation is limited and difficult to obtain.182  As discussed 
above, farmworkers remain at risk of pesticide poisoning in California and 
nationally, and there are many challenges to documenting disability from pesticide 
poisoning and other occupational illnesses through the workers’ compensation 
system.  California can serve as a model for the rest of the country by including 
farmworkers in workers’ compensation and OSHA protections, but because the 
agricultural industry is nationwide and workers often move between states, a 
national response is necessary. 
Increasing Reporting, Safety, and Accountability with Federal 
Leadership 
Considering the widespread use of pesticides and the disenfranchised 
population most vulnerable to suffer from illegal use, protection from deportation 
for poisoned farmworkers who report illegal pesticide use is one way to increase 
reporting of this crime, and ultimately, accountability.  If farmworkers do not 
 
178. FARMWORKER JUSTICE, supra note 162.  
179. Id. 
180. Shelly Davis, A Guide to Workers’ Compensation for California Clinicians 
Serving Farmworkers, FARMWORKER JUSTICE, https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/def 
ault/files/documents/California%20WC%20guide%20%28Part%201%20of%202%29.pdf. 
181. Cal. Labor Code § 1171.5(a). 
182. Shelly Davis, supra note 180; see also Cal. Labor Code § 1171.5(a). 
  
 Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 2, Summer 2018 
 
407 
 
report pesticide poisoning, it affects not only the workers’ own ability to access 
medical care and improve conditions, but also diminishes the effectiveness of 
advocacy tools and the FIFRA balancing analysis discussed in section III.  
Currently, an undocumented immigrant in the United States can qualify for a 
special visa, and thus avoid deportation, if he or she is the victim of a violent crime 
in the United States, contingent on helping law enforcement investigate or 
prosecute the criminal activity.183  This visa, called the U-visa, was enacted as 
codified in the Immigration and Nationality Act with the passage of the Trafficking 
Victims and Violence Protection Act in 2000, amending the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994.184  The U-visa was promulgated “to remove immigration 
laws as a barrier that kept battered immigrant women and children locked in 
abusive relationships.”185  Despite the original intent that the visa be used by 
female victims of domestic violence, eligibility has been expanded to other crimes 
as well.186  In order to qualify for the U-visa, a petitioner must show that he or she 
1) “suffered substantial physical or mental abuse,” 2) has information about the 
crime alleged, 3) will be helpful to law enforcement in investigation, and 4) the 
crime occurred in the United States, or can be prosecuted in a U.S. Federal 
Court.187  Currently, the statute specifies twenty-six “qualifying criminal 
activities” for U-visa eligibility.188  Also listed is the category of “other related 
crimes” which “refers to criminal offenses in which the nature and elements of the 
 
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U). 
184. Id. 
185. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act Of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). 
186. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(9) (2016) (“Qualifying crime or qualifying criminal activity 
includes one or more of the following or any similar activities in violation of Federal, State 
or local criminal law of the United States: Rape; torture; trafficking; incest; domestic 
violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; female 
genital mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade; 
kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment; blackmail; 
extortion; manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness tampering; obstruction of 
justice; perjury; or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the above mentioned 
crimes.  The term ‘any similar activity’ refers to criminal offenses in which the nature and 
elements of the offenses are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list of 
criminal activities.”). 
187. 8 C.F.R. § 214.14 (2016). 
188. Id. §214.14(a)(9) (“Qualifying crime or qualifying criminal activity includes 
one or more of the following or any similar activities in violation of Federal, State or local 
criminal law of the United States: Rape; torture; trafficking; incest; domestic violence; 
sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual exploitation; female genital 
mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; 
abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; false imprisonment; blackmail; extortion; 
manslaughter; murder; felonious assault; witness tampering; obstruction of justice; perjury; 
or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the above mentioned crimes.  The 
term ‘any similar activity’ refers to criminal offenses in which the nature and elements of 
the offenses are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list of criminal 
activities.”). 
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offenses are substantially similar to the statutorily enumerated list of criminal 
activities.”189 
While documented abuses of agricultural workers have led to federal 
investigations of forced labor and visas relating to situations of human 
trafficking,190 U-visas have not been sought as an individualized remedy for 
reporting criminal activity and assisting in criminal prosecutions of illegal 
pesticide use.  This is not surprising, given the difficulty of obtaining a U-visa for 
any individual, and the difficulty of fitting pesticide poisoning into the established 
categories of eligibility.  However, the U-visa eligibility has previously been 
expanded by Congress to respond to a perceived need, such as underreporting of 
another serious crime.191  For example, a 2011 Senate Report added “fraud in 
foreign labor contracting” to the list of U-visa crimes.192  The Report based its 
decision on the fact that this particular crime has been difficult to prosecute due to 
victims’ fear of deportation.193  The goal of the addition was to increase reporting 
and prosecution.194  Additionally, the Department of Labor Wage and Hour 
Division was conferred statutory authority to certify U-visa applications in 2015.195  
The Environmental Protection Agency, through FIFRA and WPS, as an agency 
responsible for investigating violations of workplace laws, could also be conferred 
this statutory authority by Congress. 
 
 189.    Id. § 214.14 (2016). 
190. BON APPÉTIT, supra note 3, at 58 (“Farmworkers in Forced Labor”); see also 
Claire Wilkins, Using Drones to Fight Slavery in the Fields: An Examination of the 
Practicality and Constitutionality of Applying 21st Century Technology to a 21st Century 
Problem, 24 HASTINGS ENVT’L. L.J. 157 (2018). 
191. See, e.g., Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. REP. 
112-96, 7 (2011) (“The bill adds ‘fraud in foreign labor contracting,’ as defined by 18 U.S.C. 
S 1351, to the list of crimes for which victims may be eligible to apply for a ‘U’ visa.  Fraud 
in foreign labor contracting is difficult to prosecute because victims are often reluctant to 
come forward and report the crime for fear of being deported.  Including this crime as a 
qualifying criminal activity for a ‘U’ visa will encourage greater reporting, victim 
cooperation, and prosecution of this serious offense.”). 
192. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. REP. No. 112–
96, at 7 (2011). 
193. Id. at 6 
194. Id. 
195. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, The Department of Labor Expands Its Support of Victims 
of Human Trafficking and Other Crimes, https://www.dol.gov/dol/fact-sheet/immigration 
/20150402U&TFactSheet.htm [https://perma.cc/W8FE-5BKC]; see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, U-Visa and T-Visa FAQ, https://www.dol.gov/whd/immigration/utvisa-faq.htm#2 
[https://perma.cc/A2XF-ZSXZ] (“Department of Homeland Security regulations (8 C.F.R. 
§ 214.14(a)(2)) expressly list certain federal law enforcement agencies that may certify U 
visa applications, including the Department of Labor.  In doing so, the Department of 
Homeland Security recognized that Department of Labor investigators may detect evidence 
of qualifying criminal activity during the course of investigating violations of workplace 
laws.  The Department of Labor’s authority to complete U visa certifications (Form I-918, 
Supplement B) is based on its role as a law enforcement agency that has detected the 
crimes.”). 
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Outside of the U-visa, other efforts have been made in California to provide 
legal status to farmworkers specifically in response to the recent labor shortage, 
widely attributed to the rhetoric and policies of the Trump Administration.196  
Specifically, Senators Dianne Feinstein and Kamala Harris of California proposed 
the “Agricultural Worker Program Act of 2017” which would provide a pathway 
to citizenship for eligible farmworkers.197  The Bill is supported by Senator Patrick 
Leahy of Vermont, Michael Bennet of Colorado, and Mazie Hirono of Hawaii, and 
co-sponsored by the United Farm Workers.198  The legislation would create a “blue 
card” for eligible agricultural workers, which would last for eight years.199  The 
legislation is framed in terms of the need for labor to support the economy, but has 
not specifically addressed the problem of pesticide poisoning of farmworkers.200  
Although Senator Harris cited a lack of “decent working conditions” as a 
motivating factor for the Agricultural Worker Program Act of 2017, pesticides 
were not specifically mentioned in the bill.201  This represents a federal effort to 
address some of the obstacles that the undocumented population faces in the 
agricultural industry, however, in light of the evidence regarding pesticide 
poisoning, the difficulty of reporting, and the need for federal leadership, this is 
insufficient to address an urgent problem.202 
 
196. Chris Morris, California Crops Rot as Immigration Crackdown Creates 
Farmworker Shortage, FORTUNE (Aug. 8, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/08/08/immigra 
tion-worker-shortage-rotting-crops/ [https://perma.cc/L32L-BEY9]; Tom Philpott, Trump’s 
Crackdown on Immigration is Terrible News for Anyone Who Eats Food, MOTHER JONES 
(June 26, 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/environment/ 2017/06/immigration-farm-
workers-employment-trump/ [https://perma.cc/H3FT-X9B6]; and see also O’Brien, Kruse, 
& Kruse, supra note 65, at 2 (discussing how “the farm sector’s heavy dependence on 
undocumented workers in its hired farm workforce makes agriculture particularly sensitive 
to the changes possible with immigration reform depending on the nature and extent of the 
reform.”).  Note that while immigration policy is generally seen as requiring federal action, 
states are now challenging those bounds. See, e.g., California AB-450 Employment 
Regulation: Immigrant Worker Protection Act (approved by Governor Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB450 
[https://perma.cc/Q2RP-XNAH]. 
197. S. 1034, 115th Cong. (2017–18). 
198. Bartholomew D. Sullivan, “Feinstein Bill Would Provide Farmworkers Path to 
Citizenship,” DESERT SUN (May 10, 2017), http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/politics/ 
2017/05/11/farmworker-blue-card-immigration-bill/317093001/ [https://perma.cc/8HXZ-
ZPXG]. 
199. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. REP. 112–96, 7. 
200. Sarah D. Wire, “California’s Senators Just Proposed a Path to Legal Status 
and Citizenship for Farmworkers,” L.A. TIMES, CALIFORNIA IN CONGRESS (May 3, 2017) 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2017), http://www.latimes.com /politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-
politics-updates-feinstein-harris-file-legislation-to-1493846889-htmlstory.html [https://per 
ma.cc/77DF-XPWL]. 
201. Id. 
202. It should also be noted that in light of the Trump Administration’s harsh 
immigration policies, California lawmakers have enacted the Immigrant Worker Protection 
Act (AB 450).  The law, passed October 5, 2017, “prohibit[s] an employer or other person 
acting on the employer’s behalf from providing voluntary consent to an immigration 
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On the other side of the aisle is the Agricultural Guestworker Act (“AGA”) 
of 2017, introduced by Republican Representative Bob Goodlatte of Virginia.203  
The AGA would create a new H-2C work visa program for farmworkers, 204 as a 
solution to the “expensive, flawed” H-2A program that proponents of the AGA 
argue is “plagued with red tape.”205  The AGA caters towards the agriculture 
industry, farmers, and employers of farmworkers generally.  Workers are required 
to go back to their home country for forty-five days in what is called a “touchback 
requirement,” where they can then participate in an “E-verify” system, come back 
to the U.S., and then may seek jobs during their visa period, which lasts eighteen 
months.206  The H-2C program leaves provision of housing and transportation to 
workers as “optional,” and also contains provisions that “discourage abusive 
litigation.”207  Another selling point of this program is that “protects U.S. 
taxpayers” and it “ensures Guestworkers return home.”208 
This program provides no protections for farmworkers without legal status 
and no protections for farmworkers in the event of labor abuse or pesticide 
poisoning.  This program would potentially further the abuse suffered by 
farmworkers and favor farmers without addressing the current labor shortage.209  
Farmers across the country are demanding federal immigration reform to address 
the shortage.210 
Conclusion 
The solution contemplated in this Note would be modeled after the U-visa in 
three ways: 1) increase reporting of a crime that is underreported through 
protection from deportation for undocumented victims of this crime; 2) ensure the 
victim’s continued participation with the investigation as a condition of reporting 
 
enforcement agent to enter nonpublic areas of a place of labor unless the agent provides a 
judicial warrant, except as specified.” AB 450 (Cal. 2017). 
203. Agricultural Guestworker Act of 2017, H.R. 4092, 115th Cong. (2017). 
204. Id. 
205. Chairman Bob Goodlatte, “Agricultural Guestworker Act of 2017,” H.R. 
JUDICIARY COMM. https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/102017-AG-
Act-OnePager.pdf. 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Kathleen Sexsmith & Rossana Coto-Batres, Farmworkers Deserve Better than 
Guestworker Act, TIMES UNION (Nov. 23, 2017), http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/ 
article/Farmworkers-deserve-better-than-Guestworker-Act-12380515.php [https://perma 
.cc/PF4X-A8US]. 
210. Rick Barrett, Wisconsin Dairy Farmers Push for Immigration Reform, J. 
SENTINEL (July 20, 2015),  http://archive.jsonline.com/business/wisconsin-dairy-farmers-pu 
sh-for-immigration-reform-b99541375z1-317681341.html/ [https://perma.cc/9ZZEQ CG] 
(“Wisconsin dairy farmers are pushing for immigration reform, saying they need a federal 
labor policy that guarantees they will have enough employees to maintain and expand their 
businesses.”); see also Philpott, supra note 196. 
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and a pathway to citizenship; and 3) assist in generally combatting an issue that 
primarily affects an undocumented population.  This program would increase 
reporting of pesticide-related illnesses nationally, instead of the current state-by-
state solutions that can vary widely and leave farmworkers exposed when they 
move from one state to another.  This must be coupled with an increase in funding 
for investigations, to ensure that victims’ reports are supported by a thorough 
investigation. 
With a more complete picture of the issue of pesticide poisoning of 
agricultural workers, the EPA can increase accountability of farmers and 
manufacturers who are misusing pesticides.  Additionally, increasing data on the 
effect of pesticides will allow the government to make a more informed decision 
in the FIFRA analysis and a better balance between parties’ interests, and provide 
advocates with more leverage when challenging the balancing analysis.  With this 
data, the EPA can pursue FIFRA prosecutions more effectively, thus increasing 
both the safety of farmworkers and deterrence of misuse and illegal use for farm 
owners, pesticide manufacturers, registrants, and applicators. 
This Note outlines what meaningful remedies are available to California 
farmworkers who suffer from pesticide poisoning.  This question is particularly 
important in the current political climate, and will require a multi-pronged solution.  
The fear of retribution and deportation that suppresses reporting of pesticide 
poisoning must be addressed by any proposed solutions.  With sufficient federal 
protection against deportation in place, state claims will be more accessible for 
farmworkers, and there will be more accurate reporting on pesticide-related 
illnesses.  Providing protection from deportation for farmworkers will increase 
reports of pesticide-related illness, misuse in the workplace, and exposure to 
vulnerable communities.  More data on the issue will assist in criminal 
prosecutions under FIFRA and allow for the tools already in place to do work 
effectively.  This must all be done alongside advocacy for farmworkers themselves, 
especially in an anti-immigrant political climate, as they continue to provide the 
labor which sustains the food system in this country. 
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